






Migration is an important expression of the global
factor mobility that contributes to an efficient re-
source allocation for production processes. How-
ever, migrants differ from other production factors
in that they are human beings carrying origin-specif-
ic characteristics which they take across places. Be-
cause migrants from different countries speak differ-
ent languages, behave differently and identify with
different ethnicities, beliefs and places, inter-cultural
encounters in the economic and social sphere can be
potentially costly. Direct costs range from business
transaction costs (e.g.,translation of documents,know-
ledge of local business habits/rules of conduct) to
open social conflicts. More indirect costs stem from
comparatively higher unemployment rates among
immigrants and poorer schooling outcomes for their
descendants. Decades of experience with immigra-
tion have convinced most societies that these costs
can only be reduced by integrating immigrants into
the host country. Thus, many governments are con-
cerned with the consequences of migration, and the
integration of immigrants has become of utmost im-
portance in politics.
The economic benefits of integration
Integration is a multidimensional concept spanning
the economic, political and social sphere.The result-
ing complexities make it difficult to specify one unique
definition of integration. Economists have for de-
cades been interested in the economic success of im-
migrants in terms of earnings (Chiswick 1978) but
they began only recently analysing the political and
social dimensions of integration like language profi-
ciency, citizenship or self-identification (Bauer, Ep-
stein and Gang 2005; Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier and
Zenou 2008; Dustmann 1994; Dustmann 1996;
Lazear 1999; Manning and Roy 2010).
To illustrate how the integration of immigrants re-
lates to economic costs, we initially consider the
language spoken at home as a measure of integra-
tion. Knowledge of the host country language is
crucial for any kind of day-to-day interaction.
Hence, it is hardly surprising that there is mounting
evidence for a labour market advantage for immi-
grants who are proficient in the local language in
the US, UK, Australia or Germany (Bleakley and
Chin 2004; Chiswick and Miller 1995, 2005; Dust-
mann and Fabbri 2003; Dustmann and van Soest
2002). In order to assess the relationship between
language knowledge and the costs of non-integra-
tion at the country level we construct a measure of
the fraction of pupils with immigrant backgrounds
who speak their parents’ native language at home
rather than the local one. When children speak a
foreign language at home, their parents will most
likely prefer not to speak the host country language
as well.Although we cannot directly assess the rea-
sons for speaking another language (parents might
not be capable of speaking the language or might
prefer to raise their children in their own mother
tongue for cultural reasons), it seems plausible that
the choice of language at home is an expression of
the level of integration.It indicates whether parents
want and/or can raise their children in a way that
they can optimally participate in the labour market
and civic society.
Economic benefits or costs can be analysed in vari-
ous forms.One active area of investigation relates to
immigrants’ performance on the labour market.Thus,
we use the unemployment rate among immigrants as
a measure of economic costs. However, in order to
account for general macro-trends between different
countries we “purge”these unemployment rates from
the general labour market performance by defining
immigrants’ excess unemployment as immigrants’ un-
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employment rate over natives’ unemployment rate.
This measure thus reflects how much harsher the la-
bour market conditions are for immigrants relative
to natives.
Figure 1 shows cross-country evidence for the rela-
tionship between our first integration measure and
the excess unemployment among immigrants for a
set of OECD countries.Evidently,non-integration as
measured by more pupils speaking a different lan-
guage than the local state language (of school in-
struction) is positively related to excess unemploy-
ment indicating that the lack of language skills and
language practice might bring immigrants in rela-
tively weaker labour market positions.
Although the international evidence suggests a rela-
tively clear relationship for OECD countries, this
association might potentially be confounded by the
structure and the composition of the unemployed
across countries.Even more severe,in such an analy-
sis it is impossible to assess whether the lack of inte-
gration causes some immigrants (or immigrant com-
munities) to have poorer labour market success or
vice versa.A sounder assessment of whether the de-
gree of integration affects economic benefits or costs
would be to analyse this relationship at the level of
the individual (where we can control for various de-
mographic characteristics) in a rather narrow setting
(where we can rule out cross-country differences).In
order to achieve this, in Danzer and Ulku (2011) we
specifically designed a household survey that allows
the analysis of the impact of integration on econom-
ic success among immigrant households within one
single city and within one single ethnicity, namely,
the Turkish community in Berlin.
To this end, we have set up two econometric models
that take into account the endogeneity of the relevant
variables of interest. In other words, we account for
the problem that integration directly affects income
while income may reversely affect integration:
• The “integration model” estimates the determi-
nants of integration and focuses on the role of in-
come.Therefore,we measure integration as a com-
posite index comprising citizenship, inter-ethnic
friendship networks and the ethnic composition
of co-workers.As income might be endogenously
determined, we account for this endogeneity by
using the number of working-age adults in the
household as an exclusion restriction which does
not directly affect an individual’s level of integra-
tion. Our results show that income affects inte-
gration positively.
• The “income generation model”estimates the de-
terminants of household income, focusing in par-
ticular on whether integration affects income.
This might be the case as better integrated indi-
viduals have better perspectives on the labour
market (e.g., they can access better paid jobs). In
order to identify this model,we add indicators for
whether spouses or children live in Turkey.
Clearly, immigrants with trans-national families
might be more likely to return home and thus are
less likely to integrate. Our findings indicate that
integration increases income significantly.
Since both approaches – the cross-country and the
individual setting – establish a significantly positive
correlation between integration and economic suc-
cess of immigrants, a natural question is why non-
integration among immigrants can be observed at
all? To answer this question we
will provide three possible expla-
nations:
1. High opportunity costs
2. Externalities and
3. Policy failures.
Reason for failed integration:
high opportunity costs
Much of the – often polemic – pub-
lic debate on integration failures
has centred around the unwilling-
ness of immigrants to adapt to the
culture and language of the host
country. Yet, if successful integra-
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Figure 1why should people penalise themselves through such
purely irrational behaviour? One way to look at this
puzzle is to interpret the integration decision of mi-
grants as a choice made deliberatively based on a
careful cost-benefit calculation. Upon arrival, immi-
grants are naturally not integrated. Thereafter, mi-
grants can either integrate or not, and integration
might provide economically more promising options.
However, at the same time, integration is costly as
migrants have to learn the local language and code
of conduct. Rationally, if the benefit of integration
does not exceed the cost of integration, integration
will not be pursued. The cost of integration can be
substantial, as it might also include giving up the
(natural) membership in an ethnic network that can
provide economic opportunities and alternative
sources of income.
In the study of Turkish immigrants in Berlin,we test-
ed the economic importance of ethnic communities
as an alternative to integration. We therefore mea-
sured which ethnic networks immigrants are embed-
ded in, distinguishing between local, trans-national
and familial ethnic networks. The scope and density
of these connections provide information about po-
tential economic support mechanisms for immigrants.
These networks may be relevant for job referrals
(Topa 2001) or for information regarding welfare
take-up (Bertand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 2000).
This approach allows to investigate whether ethnic
networks can economically substitute for our compos-
ite measure of integration (Danzer and Ulku 2011).
Using a quantile regression approach we show that a
positive pay-off from full integration exists only for
households in the higher guartile of the welfare dis-
tribution (Table 1). In contrast the economic returns
generated from membership in a local ethnic net-
work are significantly higher at the lower end of the
income distribution. Family networks seem to play a
somewhat different role as they are significant in the
lower and upper end of the distribution. This goes
hand in hand with our finding that local and family
networks promote income only in the non-integrat-
ed group of immigrants (Table 6 in Danzer and Ulku
2011).Generally,the evidence supports our view that
integration is too costly for lower income house-
holds, who tend to increase their economic success
by staying in local networks. In addition, transna-
tional Turkish networks lower the economic success
of the better-off households. This outcome together
with the finding that transnational networks reduce
income (Table 6 in Danzer and Ulku 2011) indicates
that the preservation of strong transnational ties is
accompanied by lower economic performance in Ger-
many.As noted earlier, this can be explained by the
costs of maintaining the transnational network.
Reason for failed integration: externalities
Even in the absence of an intrinsically low willing-
ness to integrate or rational economic alternatives to
integration, migrants might not be able to integrate.
A growing body of research has analysed the effect
of segregation and ethnic enclaves on economic suc-
cess and integration of immigrants (Borjas 1995;
1998). Cutler and Glaeser (1997) analyse the detri-
mental effects of segregation for African-Americans
in the US.The authors were the first to seriously ad-
dress the issue of endogenous selection of migrants
into certain neighbourhoods.Although it is true that
immigrants who are less willing or able to integrate
will deliberatively self-select into ethnic neighbour-
hoods where they can live without knowledge of the
local language,recent studies that attempt to control
for this endogeneity still find negative causal effects
of living among ethnic fellows on language skills
(Danzer and Yaman 2010) while the effect on wages
seems mixed (Edin et al. 2003, Damm 2009). Damm
(2009) and Edin et al. (2003) use the initial exoge-
nous placement of refugees in Denmark and Sweden
to account for current exposure to their own ethnic
group. Edin et al. (2003) find that living in enclaves
improves earnings of less-skilled refugees while no
significant effect pertains for those with more than
10 years of education.Damm (2009) finds that high-
er ethnic concentrations increase earnings irrespec-
tive of skill levels. Although these two studies have
convincingly solved the problem of self-selection, it
should be noted that refugees differ from labour
migrants and that the conditions in relatively small
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countries like Denmark and Sweden can be dissimi-
lar to larger immigration countries. The study of
Danzer and Yaman (2010) attributes the lack of so-
cial integration to negative externalities from living
among many co-ethnics. In other words, immigrants
in ethnic enclaves have fewer contact opportunities
and fewer incentives to learn the local language as
long as they can communicate more easily in their
foreign mother tongue.Thus, even at a given level of
willingness to integrate, immigrants in ghettos will
ultimately be less integrated.
While housing segregation has been a traditional field
of investigation, schooling segregation has gained in-
terest with the collection of comparable student eval-
uations in the PISA project of the OECD. Jenkins et
al. (2008) compute simple dissimilarity indices of pu-
pils’ social background in the PISA rounds 2000 and
2003 for selected OECD countries.These dissimilari-
ty indices measure social status as a households’ posi-
tion at the national social position index or according
to mothers’ educational status and range between zero
(no segregation, or in other words equal distribution
of pupils with different social backgrounds across
schools) and one (perfect segregation, or in other
words pupils of different social backgrounds are per-
fectly separated). Countries with especially high lev-
els of social segregation at the level of secondary
schools are Austria,Belgium and Germany while low
levels of segregation can be found in the Nordic coun-
tries Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The former
countries tend to have strong academic selection at
relatively young ages while the latter do not. The
international sample of OECD countries employed
for Figure 2 clearly indicates that countries with high-
er social dissimilarity indices also tend to have larger
immigrant-native test score gaps. In other words, we
observe that immigrants perform relatively weaker
than natives in countries where pupils from low
social background are segregated to specific schools.
Reason for failed integration: policy failure
The third potential reason for failed integration is
related to integration policies. It is important to dis-
tinguish between ex-ante and ex-post policies. Ex-
ante policies mainly constitute immigration controls
where countries try to pre-select migrants with fa-
vourable characteristics and skills. Such entry barri-
ers for weaker candidates were not only considered
as a means to optimally serve the host labour market
but also as instruments that prevent non-integration.
Point-based systems are intensively used in Anglo-
Saxon countries, but their effectiveness might be re-
duced by alternative entry modes (Antecol et al.
2003).A number of European countries have recent-
ly started to target highly skilled immigrants (e.g.,
Germany, France and Portugal).
More variation across countries exists with respect
to ex-post integration policies that are used to facili-
tate the integration of immigrants into the host soci-
ety upon arrival. Table 2 shows the mean values for
several migration, integration, schooling and policy
measures for a set of OECD countries.The countries
are grouped into three categories:
• A group in which school children with immigrant
backgrounds have a similar socio-economic status
as their native counterparts. (Group 1)
• A group in which descendents of immigrants have
a significantly lower socio-economic status – be-
tween one fifth and one half of a
standard deviation below the
native average. (Group 2)
• A group in which immigrant
pupils have a much lower socio-
economic status measured as
being at least half a standard
deviation below the native av-
erage. (Group 3)
As indicated in Table 2, the coun-
tries that fall into the third group
have much poorer integration out-
comes than countries from catego-
ry 1, although these countries dif-
fer relatively little with respect to
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Figure 2This shows that the pure size of the immigrant popu-
lation is not responsible for different integration out-
comes. However, countries in which immigrant fam-
ilies are more disadvantaged have higher social seg-
regation and higher shares of households communi-
cating in their original mother tongue – a sign for
non-integration.This translates into relatively weak-
er schooling outcomes for immigrants in countries
where they have a more disadvantaged social posi-
tion. The native–immigrant PISA test score gap is
positive in all countries; however, the distance is
much larger where immigrants tend to come from
poorer social backgrounds.
The most interesting variables refer to policy out-
comes from the Migrant Integration Policy Index, a
measure collected by the Migration Policy Group.
These measures rate the quality of integration poli-
cies on a scale from zero (indicating that the situa-
tion of the integration policy is critically unfavour-
able to immigrants) to 100 (indicating a country where
the integration policy follows best practice).Our first
measure relates to anti-discrimination laws as these
are meant to provide an important safeguard for
immigrants’ economic opportunities. Evidently, the
countries with poorer anti-discrimination laws are
those where immigrants tend to live in socio-eco-
nomically more precarious conditions. It should be
noted that it is impossible to establish any causality
here, so we cannot assess whether immigrants are
worse off due to these regulations or whether poor-
ly skilled and integrated immigrants live in stricter
countries because other countries positively select
migrants. Similarly, countries in which immigrants
are less well protected against discrimination make it
much more difficult to attain citizenship. In most
countries only the adoption of citizenship grants full
civic rights (like voting etc.),so that barriers in access
make integration as a long-term strategy economi-
cally disadvantageous and politically unviable.
Conclusions
In the political sphere immigration has been a con-
troversial topic for many years. Alleged ethnic and
cultural tensions, immigrants’ disadvantaged employ-
ment and educational outcomes on the one hand and
the struggle for better protection against discrimina-
tion and increased incentives for integration on the
other hand have often been discussed in ideological
terms in many European societies. Economists can
contribute to this debate, first, by analysing the eco-
nomic setting of integration, and second, by provid-
ing a perspective that acknowledges the individual
immigrant as an economically rational agent.
The evidence presented in this article has shown that
integration is associated with economic benefits at
the aggregate country level as well as for the individ-
ual household.This led to the natural question:Why
are some immigrants not integrated if non-integra-
tion is economically disadvantageous? We provided
three reasons. Firstly, immigrants will choose to inte-
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have far less favourable SOE
status ( 0.5 of st.dev.)
15.1 0.35  0.56  41.0 42.8 56.1 44.1
Countries where immigrants
have less favourable SOE
status (0.20 - 0.49 of st.dev.)
7.8 0.34  0.37  40.0 31.6 70.4 46.4
Countries where immigrants
have comparable SOE status
to natives
11.0 0.32  0.25  34.7 28.3 76.7 66.0
Socio-economic status (SOE) of immigrants as defined in PISA (2006).
* Dissimilarity Index taken from Jenkins et al. (2008). – ** This variable is computed as the share of pupils speaking a 
language different from the language of instruction at home over the share of students from an immigrant background (as
defined by the fraction of pupils with an immigrant mother). This definition was chosen, as in most countries mothers clearly
spend more time with the children during their childhood. Very similar results apply for alternative definitions with fathers or 
both parents. – *** Category taken from the Migrant Integration Policy Index ranging from zero (critically unfavourable) to
100 (best practice).
Source: PISA (2006); Jenkins et al. (2008); MIPEX Integration Index, www.integrationindex.eu; Database on Immigrants in
OECD countries (DIOC), OECD (2008); own calculations.CESifo DICE Report 4/2011 19
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grate if integration pays off. This requires that inte-
gration costs are not excessive. However, these costs
are substantial for economically weaker households
for whom ethnic networks provide viable alternative
sources of income. Secondly, the social and ethnic
segregation of immigrants across space provides rel-
atively fewer opportunities and incentives to inte-
grate. This can lead to poorer integration outcomes
even if all immigrants are completely willing to ac-
quire proficiency in the local language, culture and
code of conduct. Thirdly, policies may reduce the
incentives to integrate. Insufficient anti-discrimina-
tion laws and poor access to an immigration country’s
citizenship can be found in those countries where
immigrants perform less well at school, where segre-
gation is greater and integration weaker.
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